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Abstract: Many studies on the fertility differential by religion have considered both 
Catholics and Protestants to be equally homogenous groups. Contrary to these studies, we 
contend that Protestant fertility must be studied in the context of heterogeneous groups. 
Specifically, conservative Protestantism, with its beliefs about artificial birth control 
mirroring Catholic teaching, should be examined separately from other Protestant 
traditions. Using data from the General Social Survey we find that conservative Protestants 
and Catholics had about the same level of fertility, while mainline Protestants have a 
fertility rate that is significantly lower than that of Catholics. We also examine the changes 
in these differences over time. 










Membership in a religious tradition or denomination can affect fertility [1,2]. Historically, much 
research has aimed to describe the intersection of religion and fertility in the United States [3-7]. This 
research has focused on the differential fertility of Protestants and Catholics, but has largely ignored 
the difference between Protestant sub-groups. In particular, there has been very little research looking 
at the effect of being a conservative Protestant on fertility compared with other religious groups. 
Following the work of Woodberry and Smith [8], we use the term ―conservative Protestant‖ in place of 
Steensland et al.‘s [9] ―evangelical Protestant.‖ Since ―conservative‖ Protestant includes evangelicals 
as well as fundamentalists and Pentecostals, it is a more inclusive categorization of the Protestant  
sub-groups of interest to us.  
Conservative Protestantism represents the largest religious tradition in the United States, which 
corresponds to roughly 30% of the U.S. population [8,10]. Hout and Fischer [11] found that 
conservative Christians tend to have higher fertility than non-conservatives, and thus predicted a 
growth of conservative religious traditions over time, which includes conservative Protestants. One 
prominent study looking at the fertility differences between U.S. Protestants concluded that 
evangelical Protestants will be the next promising arena for the study of American fertility behavior 
([6], p. 542): 
 Recent surveys have found an increase in religious interest in the United States, probably due 
in part to the so-called evangelical movement. Yet almost nothing is known about the fertility 
consequences of this phenomenon. As Catholic and Protestant fertility levels continue to 
converge (Westoff and Jones), this and other dimensions of Protestant life seem promising 
choices as new arenas for the study of American fertility behavior. 
The primary purpose of this study is to examine the association between conservatism and fertility 
in the United States. Are the higher levels of fertility found among conservative Protestants due to 
intrinsic components of their religious tradition, or are they a statistical artifact created by an 
underlying demographic structure? That is, does religious affiliation explain their high levels of 
fertility, or does the characteristic hypothesis—which asserts underlying demographic characteristics 
are the primary predictors of fertility—provide more accurate predictors of their fertility?  
By examining this association, we will add to the literature in two important ways. First, currently 
there is little research applying multivariate models to explain the relationship between conservative 
Protestants and fertility behavior. This study hopes to re-open research on religion and fertility in the 
U.S. specifically focusing on conservative Protestants. Second, this study will explore future fertility 
trends of conservative Protestants, which will have implications relating to the future of the U.S. 
religious and political landscape. Future fertility trends are important because of conservatives‘ 
influence as a religious and political movement, and their growth may affect their efficacy as a social 
movement [12]. 
2. Background 
Religious affiliation and fertility were formerly at the forefront of demographic research in the 
United States. Pearce [13] posits that, given the many studies demonstrating that the number of 




children in a family varies from religion to religion, it is reasonable to assume that there is a 
connection between religion and fertility. Most research in this tradition emphasizes the discrepant 
fertility patterns between Catholics and Protestants [14,15]. These studies, along with those focusing 
on the Jewish population (e.g., [16]), found Catholicism to be more highly correlated with high fertility 
rates compared to Protestants, Jews, and the non-religious. One of the strongest suggested reasons for 
high fertility among Catholics was the Church‘s teaching on contraception and abortion, which 
strongly prohibited artificial birth control (excluding the rhythm method). Westoff and Jones [7] found 
that Catholic and non-Catholic fertility rates in America were slowly converging until the baby boom 
occurred. During the 1950s and early 1960s, Catholic fertility skyrocketed compared to other religions, 
significantly widening the gap not previously seen in the 19
th
 century. By the time Vatican II occurred 
and the papal encyclical on birth control became public, about one-third of American Catholic women 
were on the birth control pill [14]. Lenski [17], among others (e.g., [18]), found that the extent to 
which church members are willing to reform their birth control practices changed the way Catholic 
leaders thought about ―authority‖ and ―dissent.‖ It is at this time when the Catholic Church began to 
intervene in the sexual behaviors of the married faithful. This led parishioners to begin to disobey 
church teaching on contraception, among other things. 
The final outcome of these changes was Catholic fertility rates matching that of other religious 
denominations. Westoff and Jones ([7], p. 209) pinnacled this phenomenon with a paper entitled ―The 
End of ‗Catholic‘ Fertility,‖ concluding that, although Catholics in the mid 20
th
 century had slightly 
higher fertility than their non-Catholic counterparts at this time, towards the mid-1970s ―the two trends 
nearly come together,‖ effectively ending a uniquely Catholic fertility rate. With the apparent end of a 
―Catholic‖ fertility having thus occurred, interest in religious affiliation and how it affects fertility 
withered away as discrepancies in fertility levels between religious groups approached zero.  
Along these lines, work by Bartkowski, Xu, and Levin [19] and more specifically Mahoney et al. 
[20] suggests that ―sanctification theory‖ helps to explain the convergence. Mahoney ([20],  
p. 222-223) notes that believers ―view family relationships as sacred… Judeo-Christian religions 
portray the burdens and pleasures of parenting as opportunities to model and deepen one‘s 
understanding of God‘s love, patience, and commitment, and frame the parental role as a sacred calling 
that requires personal sacrifices.‖ Both the Catholic and conservative Protestant faiths have strong 
emphases on child-rearing as a vocation, responsibility, and calling from God to do their duty and treat 
children as a gift. By having more children, then, it may be perceived that a couple is being a ―good 
Christian.‖ This is particularly true for conservative Protestants because of their strong belief in the 
Bible as the literal word of God and the various Biblical commands to ―multiply,‖ populate the earth, 
and the like (as well as God‘s anger at those who attempt birth control, such as Onan‘s withdrawal). 
Thus, more conservative denominations likely place more emphasis on the Bible and its pronatalist 
worldview. Scripture, along with sin and salvation, constitute Bartkowski‘s ―three S‘s‖ that 
differentiate conservative Protestants from all others [21]. The authors note that while sanctification of 
the family may be good in that it promotes social cohesion, it can also prove negative in situations such 
as the family whose parents are of differing religions. 
Past research comparing Protestant and Catholic fertility tended to lump all Protestants together 
much in the same way as Catholics are lumped together—that is, as one unitary Protestant Church 
similar to the one Catholic Church—and thus did not pick up the higher levels of fertility occurring for 




conservative Protestants [3,4,7]. This collapsing of Protestant denominations into one conceptual 
group risks the validity of studies comparing fertility rates by religion. For example, Bean et al. ([22], 
p. 91) lamented how past studies typically classify respondents as ―Protestants, Catholics, and Jews; 
these categories are not homogenous enough to provide a fair test of the relation between religion and 
fertility‖ which was particularly problematic with their sample of Utah Mormons. In addition, Pearce 
([13], p. 20) notes that ―within Protestantism, studies show substantial variation in fertility across 
affiliations.‖ Possible explanations for such variation include demographic transition theory and the 
minority status hypothesis (for a comprehensive review, see [13]). 
When conservative Protestants are distinguished from the rest of mainline Protestants, their fertility 
consistently remains higher than that of mainline Protestants and Catholics. Figure 1 shows the average 
number of reported children for conservatives, mainline Protestants, and Catholics. All three 
denominations witnessed a drop in the average number of reported children over the last three decades. 
This result is consistent with prior research that finds all major religious communities in the United 
States witnessed a drop in the expected family size as the second demographic revolution occurred 
[23,24]. Conservatives have largely maintained a higher average number of reported children since 
1984 than Catholics and Mainline Protestants. Indeed, this mirrors Hout and Fischer‘s [11] work that 
finds that the vast majority of conservative Christian growth is due to higher fertility and not 
conversion. As Greeley [25] hypothesized in his monograph Religion in the Year 2000, growth of a 
particular religion or denomination will most certainly be determined by the number of present-day 
adherents‘ children, not by conversion rates. If conservative Protestants have large families with many 
children, while Mainline Protestants have smaller families, then conservatives should theoretically 
have the advantage of numbers in the proceeding generation. This is especially true for conservatives 
who begin parenting at markedly younger ages than mainline denominations, thus allowing more time 
for family growth early in the life course [26]. 
2.1. Who are the Conservative Protestants? 
Conservative Protestantism is flourishing in the United States while liberal Protestant church 
membership is in decline [27]. The literature tells that conservative Protestantism acquires and 
maintains members because they demand complete loyalty, unwavering belief, and rigid adherence to 
a specified way of life [28,29]. Conservative Protestantism is said to have developed in the 1970s as a 
reaction to the social revolution which occurred in the previous decade. Conservative Protestants 
believe that the greater personal freedoms in gender roles and sexuality which became prevalent in the 
previous decade were undermining their core values [30]. Also, Christian Right activism and 
evangelical growth focused on resistance to moral relativism in the surrounding culture. Indeed, as 
Emerson and Hartman ([31], p. 127) write: ―Without modernization and secularization [of this century] 
there would be no fundamentalism…‖ Membership in evangelical groups has risen significantly since 
the initial push for activism initiated in the 1970s, with conservative Protestants making up more than a 
―quarter of the American population‖ in 1998 and varying from many Americans in their unique 
opinions on ―…gender-roles, childrearing styles, [and] political orientation…‖ ([8], p. 25). Shibley 
[32] outlines three components for defining contemporary conservative Protestantism: (1) Have had a 
born-again experience resulting in a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, (2) Accept the full 




authority of the bible in matters of faith and in daily conduct, and (3) Are committed to spreading the 
gospel by bearing public witness to their faith. These three components provide the common thread for 
all conservative Protestants.  
2.2. Conservative Protestants and Fertility 
Theory on religious influences on fertility coupled with prior research on conservative Protestants 
suggests that there are good reasons to believe that the religious beliefs and practices of conservatives 
influence their fertility. Current theory on religion and fertility states that there are three components 
that allow religion to influence fertility behavior [1]. First, religions articulate behavioral norms that 
have linkages to fertility outcomes (e.g., directive on contraception or teachings related to gender roles 
and family life). Second, religious groups possess the means to communicate its teachings to its 
members and enforce compliance. Lastly, members with a strong sense of attachment to the religious 
community will likely adhere with its norms and teachings. By comparing previous literature studying 
conservative Protestants with the aforementioned theory on fertility and religion, a strong case can be 
made to infer that conservative Protestantism influences fertility.  
The first component is present with contemporary conservative Protestant churches advocating 
strong prohibitive norms concerning sexuality, gender roles, and family values [8,32]. Also, 
conservatives look to the Bible for matters of faith and daily conduct, in which there is considerable 
evidence that the Bible advocates having numerous children. For example, Genesis 1:28 states ―Have 
many children so that your descendants will live all over the earth and bring it under their control.‖ 
The second component highlights communication and enforcement of general norms. Again previous 
research has found conservative Protestants largely possess these means as they acquire and maintain 
members by demanding loyalty, unwavering belief, and rigid adherence to a specified way of life 
[28,29]. The last component requires a strong sense of attachment to the religious community, which 
conservative Protestants possess as evident by the popularity of their new market oriented places of 
worship [32]. In addition, evangelicalism is a religious movement created by feelings of alienation 
from what they view as an increasing secularized world. These feelings of alienation coupled with 
numerous popular congregations, in which like-minded individuals attend, provide compelling 
evidence that many conservative Protestants will feel a strong sense of attachment to their religious 
community. Overall, there is reasonable evidence to suggest that conservative Protestantism will 
influence fertility. 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1. Data 
The data come from the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS is based on a probability sample of 
the adult civilian population of the United States, stratified by region and metropolitan versus  
non-metropolitan residence. The GSS continues to use in-person interviews, and sampling techniques 
and response rates are well documented [33]. A major advantage of the GSS is that most of the 
questions keep the same wording from year to year, so data can easily be compared longitudinally or 
pooled across years. As per the suggestions in the GSS technical information, sample weights were not 




used in our analyses. This is because from 1984-2002 the data were taken from a full probability 
sample of households in the U.S., thus making the GSS self-weighting. Also, as suggested, we did not 
include data from 1987, because of an over-sample of Blacks. After 2004, weights are necessary only 
if the data are analyzed within year. Thus, since our focus is longitudinal and we include dummy 
variables for each year in our models, we do not have to include sample weights in our models.  
3.2. Variables 
The dependent variable is self-reported fertility. The GSS asked respondents the following question 
[GSS mnemonic = CHILDS]: ―How many children have you ever had? Please count all that were born 
alive at any time (including any you had from a previous marriage).‖ The response categories ranged 
from zero to eight or more children. This question was asked in 17 years over the period 1984 to 2008.  
The following independent variables were included in the models. We measured sex as a dummy 
variable for female. Although the original dataset included white and an ―other‖ category, we 
measured race as a dummy variable distinguishing black from all other races. Age was measured 
continuously by the GSS with a range of 18 to 89 years old. To account for expected non-linearity in 
the effect of age on fertility, we also included age-squared in the models. Education was included as a 
continuous variable that ranged from 0 to 20 years of schooling. Marital status is a dichotomous 
variable that distinguished those married were from those unmarried. We treated household income (in 
real 2000 dollars) as a continuous variable. A dummy variable to distinguish respondents living in the 
South from those living elsewhere was created and included in the models. The specific delineation of 
the states into these regions was determined by the way in which the GSS partitioned the states into 
regional categories (see Davis et al. [33] for further explanation). We also compared those living in 
rural areas from those living elsewhere (non-rural). As differentiated by Tuch [34,35], rural included 
the following areas: Not within an SMSA or standard metropolitan statistical area, (within a county) 
and—a small city (10,000 to 49,999); a town or village (2,500 to 9,999); an incorporated area less than 
2,500 or an unincorporated area of 1,000 to 2,499; open country within larger civil divisions, e.g., 
township, division. Finally, we use Steensland et al.‘s [9] typology to place GSS respondents into 
religious groups. These groups are as follows: Catholics, those with no religious affiliation, those 
claiming religious faiths other than Christian. The Protestant group was further separated into 
conservative Protestants, Black Protestants, and other Protestants. Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistics for all the variables discussed above along with means by decade and correlations with time. 
3.3. Analytic Strategy 
Since the dependent variable is a count variable (i.e., number of children), the most appropriate 
method of analysis is negative binomial or Poisson regression. The model takes the following form: 
log(m) = a + bx, where the dependent variable (y) and the mean of y (m) are related by the Poisson 
distribution (error). Unlike ordinary regression, however, the variance of the error term is fixed. In an 
ordinary regression, the error variance is estimated from the model. With the Poisson distribution, the 
error variance is equal to m (the mean). If the Poisson distribution is appropriate, the deviance will 
have a chi-square distribution with N-k degrees of freedom, where N is the number of cases (not the 




total number of events) and k is the number of parameters fitted. In effect, Poisson regression is a  
log-linear model because it uses the log link. 




µ or % 
1984-89 
µ or % 
1990-99 
µ or % 
2000-08 
µ or % 
Corr. w/ 
time 
Number of Children 0–8 1.87 (1.72) 2.01 1.84 1.84 -0.024* 
Married 0–1 50.4 % 53.6 % 50.1 % 48.9 % -0.047* 
Female 0–1 56.1 % 56.8 % 56.5 % 55.2 % -0.018* 
Education 0–20 13.1 (3.07) 12.4 13.2 13.4 0.036* 
Income / 1000 0–141 26.8 (29.3) 26.7 27.4 30.5 0.121* 
Black 0–1 13.9 % 17.0 % 13.2 % 13.8 % -0.004 
Urban residence 0–1 40.6 % 45.0 % 41.7 % 43.6 % -0.077* 
South 0–1 36.1 % 35.7 % 35.7 % 37.9 % 0.021* 
Pre-New Dealers (<1909) 0–1 1.8 % 4.8 % 1.1 % 0.3 % -0.129* 
New Dealers (1909-21) 0–1 7.4 % 13.8 % 7.7 % 2.5 % -0.169* 
WW II generation (1922-29) 0–1 7.4 % 10.5 % 7.7 % 4.8 % -0.089* 
Cold Warriors (1930-45) 0–1 18.7 % 21.9 % 19.3 % 16.5 % -0.057* 
Early Boomers (1946-54) 0–1 17.9 % 20.2 % 18.6 % 15.7 % -0.049* 
Late Boomers (1955-65) 0–1 24.8 % 24.7 % 26.6 % 22.9 % -0.021* 
Generation X (1966-77) 0–1 16.7 % 4.0 % 18.2 % 24.1 % 0.205* 
Generation Y (1978+) 0–1 5.3 % ----- 0.7 % 13.3 % 0.265* 
Age 18–89 45.8 (17.3) 45.3 45.5 46.6 0.036* 
Church attendance 0–8 3.7 (2.69) 3.9 3.7 3.6 -0.061* 
Catholic 0–1 25.2 % 25.5 % 25.1 % 25.2 % -0.006 
Protestant 0–1 57.8 % 62.9 % 58.3 % 53.9 % -0.075* 
Mainline Protestant 0–1 22.9 % 23.7% 23.4 % 21.4 % -0.032* 
Conservative Protestant 0–1 21.7 % 22.9 % 22.7 % 20.0 % -0.036* 
Black Protestant 0–1 9.0 % 12.1 % 8.5 % 8.1 % -0.029* 
Other Protestant 0–1 4.2% 4.1 % 3.7 % 4.4 % -0.001 
Other religion 0–1 5.1 % 4.3 % 5.6 % 5.1 % 0.016* 
No religion 0–1 11.9 % 7.3 % 10.9 % 15.7 % 0.111* 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.05 
 
The restriction of variance = mean (σ
2
 = µ) is often hard to satisfy. In fact, our data are what is 
known as ―over-dispersed.‖ This occurs when the variance is greater than the mean (σ
2
 > µ), see Table 1. 
Running a Poisson model on over-dispersed data can produce unreliable results. If the error is 
uncorrelated with independent variables, the estimates of the parameters will be unbiased and 
consistent. However, the standard errors will be underestimated. To avoid this pitfall, methodologists 
suggest that the negative binomial model is the most appropriate method of analyzing count data that 
are over-dispersed. The coefficients from negative binomial are interpreted the same as those from 
Poisson regression: (e
B
−1)*100, for percent change, and e
B
, for estimated counts. Negative binomial 
assumes that the systematic part is log(m) = a + bx + u, where u is a random variable with a gamma 
distribution. The relationship between m and y is again given by a Poisson distribution. The 
combination of these two assumptions gives you a particular distribution, the negative binomial. The 




assumption of a gamma distribution for u is somewhat arbitrary. Basically, the assumption is made 
because it gives a reasonably simple and well known distribution when combined with Poisson. In 
sum, using the negative binomial model will give more efficient estimates when the distribution is 
over-dispersed.  
4. Results 
4.1. General Trends 
Figure 1 displays annual change in mean reported fertility by religious group. Fertility is simply the 
number of children reported by respondents; it ranges from zero children to eight or more children. 
The ceiling of eight children was set by the GSS; however this does help to alleviate some of the skew 
in the variable (skewedness = 1.107; Kurtosis = 1.174). Reported fertility (hereafter, we will use 
―fertility‖ in place of ―reported fertility‖) decreases steadily from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s 
before rebounding after the turn of the century; particularly among Catholics.  














The trends by religious group basically follow the trend of overall fertility (i.e., higher fertility in 
the early period and lower fertility until late in the period); however, there are two noticeable 
differences. First, the trend for Catholics is lower than that for Protestants. This realigning of fertility 
rates by religious group has been documented in other demographic research and thus our results 
reaffirm that work (e.g., [7]). Secondly, the fertility rates of conservative Protestants are higher than 
that of both Catholics and other Protestant groups. This trend is especially clear in the early- to  
mid-stages of our analysis period. In the next section, we explore in more detail these trends. 
 




4.2. Regression Models 
Table 2 shows parameter estimates and fit statistics from three different models. The first model 
includes period effects (dummy variables for each year) and demographic variables with no 
interactions between them. The estimated effects of the demographic variables are reported in 
Column 1, while the period effects are omitted to save space.  









Intercept -1.919*** (0.069) -1.866*** (0.069) -1.881*** (0.069) 
Cohort    
Pre-New Dealers (before 1909) -0.239* (0.105) -0.240* (0.108) -0.244* (0.108) 
New Dealers (1909-21) -0.173 (0.091) -0.178 (0.091) -0.183* (0.091) 
World War II (1922-29) 0.031 (0.230) 0.024 (0.081) 0.019 (0.081) 
Cold Warriors (1930-45) 0.151* (0.069) 0.143* (0.069) 0.137* (0.069) 
Early Boomers (1946-54) 0.150** (0.043) 0.143* (0.057) 0.138* (0.057) 
Late Boomers (1955-65) 0.223*** (0.049) 0.216*** (0.049) 0.212*** (0.049) 
Generation X (1966-77) 0.272*** (0.042) 0.269*** (0.042) 0.266*** (0.042) 
Generation Y (1978+) ---- ---- ---- 
Age 0.088*** (0.003) 0.088*** (0.003) 0.088*** (0.003) 
Age*Age -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 
Married 0.357*** (0.010) 0.356*** (0.010) 0.356*** (0.010) 
Female 0.155*** (0.009) 0.154*** (0.009) 0.154*** (0.009) 
Education  -0.056*** (0.002) -0.054*** (0.002) -0.053*** (0.002) 
Income (divided by 10,000) -0.003* (0.001) -0.004* (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) 
Black 0.280*** (0.013) 0.292*** (0.013) 0.284*** (0.019) 
Rural 0.084*** (0.013) 0.087*** (0.013) 0.086*** (0.013) 
South -0.046*** (0.010) -0.040*** (0.010) -0.046*** (0.010) 
Religious Service Attendance 0.020*** (0.002) 0.016*** (0.002) 0.015*** (0.002) 
    
Protestant ---- -0.058*** (0.011) ---- 
Other Religion ---- -0.170*** (0.024) -0.172*** (0.024) 
No Religion ---- -0.139*** (0.019) -0.139*** (0.019) 
Catholic ---- ---- ---- 
    
Mainline Protestant ---- ---- -0.097*** (0.012) 
Conservative Protestant ---- ---- -0.014 (0.013) 
Black Protestant ---- ---- -0.039 (0.023) 
Other Protestant ---- ---- -0.035 (0.024) 
    
Deviance 38624.2 38651.6 38650.6 
LR χ2 (Δ from null model) 3992.5*** (35) 3965.1*** (38) 3966.1*** (41) 
N 33,587 33,587 33,587 
    
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dummy variables 
for each survey Year were omitted to save space. Coefficients were not transformed by 
exponentiation for presentation. LR χ2 = deviancenull - deviancefitted, with the number of parameters 
for the significance test in parentheses. 




The results in Column 1 show that married people, females, blacks, and those who live in rural 
areas, and those who attend religious services regularly all report having more children than their 
specific counterparts. On the other hand, the more educated, the more affluent, and Southerners report 
having fewer children than those in the alternative groups. The cohort variable shows the expected 
pattern of those born in the earlier eras have significantly more children than those from Generation Y 
(born after 1978). The effects of age were non-linear. Specifically, the results suggest that additional 
years of age increase fertility (effect of age = 0.088, p < 0.001) at a decreasing rate (effect of  
age-squared = −0.001, p < 0.001). Hence, the age effects take on the expected inverted U shape.  
Model 2 adds predictors for religious affiliation to the period effects and demographic predictors 
found in Model 1. Specifically, we added dummy variables for Protestant, those claiming other 
religious faiths, and those reporting no religious ties. The reference group is Catholics. The inclusion 
of the new predictors did not significantly change the direction or significance of the estimates noted in 
Model 1. The second model addresses the difference in fertility between the two largest religious 
denominations, Catholic and Protestant. As expected, on average and net of other predictors, 
Protestants reported significantly fewer children than Catholics. In fact, our models suggest that 
Protestants have about (e
.058
−1)*100 = 5.6% fewer children than Catholics. Also, those of other 
religious faiths and no religion had significantly lower fertility than Catholics—however, these groups 
have fewer respondents in them. 
Model 3 further separates the Protestant denomination into four categories—Mainline Protestants 
(e.g., Presbyterians, Episcopalians, etc.), Black Protestants (e.g., National Baptist Convention, National 
Missionary Baptist Convention, etc.), conservative Protestants (e.g., Church of Christ, Pentecostals, 
etc.), and ―other‖ Protestants (Lutherans, Methodists, etc.). Again, Catholic is the reference group. 
Theory and research predicts that conservative Protestants should have lower fertility than Catholics, 
but higher fertility than mainline Protestants or any of the other Protestant groups. The results for 
Model 3 support this assertion. Specifically, on average and net of all other predictors, mainline 
Protestants have significantly lower fertility than Catholics. To explain further, mainline Protestants 
have about (e
.097
−1)*100 = 9.2% fewer children than Catholics. Importantly, the fertility of 
conservative, Black, and other Protestants was not significantly different than that of Catholics.  
With respect to comparing across the religious groups, our results suggest that membership in the 
different religious groups had differential effects on fertility. Specifically, an F-test for class variable 
comparison showed that the coefficients for at least one of the religious groups differed from the others 
F[6,35896] = 20.58, p < 0.001. Subsequent analyses revealed the differences to be mainly associated 
with the fertility of mainline Protestants. Over the entire time-period the fertility of mainline 
Protestants was about 1.85 children, while the fertility of conservative Protestants was significantly 
higher at about 2.03 children. The fertility of Black Protestants was also significantly higher than that 
of mainline or conservative Protestants at about 2.38 children. Thus, the results show that the fertility 
of conservative Protestants was significantly higher than that of mainline Protestants, but significantly 
lower than that of Catholics or Black Protestants.  
The results presented so far are not unique and coincide with many other studies of religion and 
fertility. However, one area that is largely understudied is the trends in fertility of each religious group 
over time. According to previous research, conservative Protestants have higher fertility than other 
groups and that this is what is driving their increasing numbers [6,36,37]. This suggests that fertility 




rates by religious group should show conservative Protestant fertility to be moving away from that of 
mainline and other Protestant sects. 
In order to test the hypothesis that in the last few decades the fertility rates of conservative 
Protestants have moved away from that of mainline Protestants and Catholics, it is necessary to include 
interactions between the key independent variables representing religious denomination and some 
function of time. The most general form of interaction would treat year as a class variable. Since this 
approach would involve estimating a large number of parameters, it would have relatively low power. 
Consequently, it is desirable to use some simple function of time in the interaction term. Since we are 
interested in gradual shifts, the most obvious possibility is a linear trend term increasing from 0 in 
1984 to 24 in 2008. Interactions involving a trend term imply a steady divergence or convergence of 
groups over the whole period. In reality, change might take more complex forms—for example, the 
difference between groups might grow for a period of time, but then remain constant. However, the 
linear trend model provides a useful analytic starting point. 
Estimates from a model including interactions with a linear trend are shown in the first and second 
columns of Table 3. The main effects are shown in the second column, while the interactions are 
shown in the third column. Our theoretical argument implies that the interactions between religious 
denomination and trend will be non-zero; that is, the fertility of conservative Protestants is growing 
relative to Catholics. In contrast to this expectation, the interaction with conservative Protestant is 
negative and not significant (B = −0.003, p > 0.05). A non-significant coefficient means that the trends 
in fertility rates for Catholics and conservative Protestants are moving in parallel. Said another way, 
over time, the gap between Catholics and conservative Protestants has remained the same. However, 
the gap between Catholics and those with other religious affiliations and those with no religious 
affiliation is growing larger (B = −0.007, p < 0.05 and B = −0.005, p < 0.05, respectively). This means 
that, the negative effects of no religion and other religion on fertility are growing stronger over time; 
said another way and relative to Catholics, those with no religion and other religions are having fewer 
children over time. The interactions involving the other religious dummy variables were  
non-significant. That is, although these variables may affect fertility, there is no indication that the 
effects have grown or declined over time.  







Intercept -4.223*** (0.356)  
Trend 0.131*** (0.018)  
Cohort   
Pre-New Dealers (before 1909) 0.961** (0.171) -0.053** (0.020) 
New Dealers (1909-21) 0.659 (0.354) -0.034* (0.017) 
World War II (1922-29) 0.777* (0.353) -0.035* (0.017) 
Cold Warriors (1930-45) 1.066** (0.350) -.050** (0.017) 
Early Boomers (1946-54) 1.326*** (0.346) -0.066*** (0.017) 
Late Boomers (1955-65) 1.347*** (0.065) -0.054*** (0.017) 
Generation X (1966-77) 0.695* (0.344) -0.011 (0.017) 
Generation Y (1978+) ---- ---- 




Table 3. Cont. 
Age 0.150*** (0.006) -0.004*** (0.000) 
Age*Age -0.001*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
Married 0.338*** (0.010)  
Female 0.149*** (0.009)  
Education  -0.054*** (0.002)  
Income (divided by 10,000) -0.003 (0.002)  
Black 0.276*** (0.018)  
Rural 0.085*** (0.013)  
South -0.045*** (0.010)  
Religious Service Attendance 0.015*** (0.002)  
   
Other Religion -0.091* (0.046) -0.007* (0.003) 
No Religion -0.078* (0.038) -0.005* (0.002) 
Mainline Protestant -0.077*** (0.024) -0.002 (0.002) 
Conservative Protestant 0.009 (0.023) -0.003 (0.003) 
Black Protestant -0.023 (0.033) -0.001 (0.002) 
Other Protestant 0.001 (0.044) 0.075 (0.005) 
Catholic ---- ---- 
   
Deviance  38439.4 
LR χ
2
 (Δ from null model)  4177.4*** (55) 
N  33,587 
   
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients were not 
transformed by exponentiation for presentation. LR χ2 = deviancenull - deviancefitted, with the 
number of parameters for the significance test in parentheses. 
 
The interactions involving age and several of the cohort categories were also statistically 
significant. The results for age are more complicated and suggest that the inverted U shape seen in 
Model 3 is ―flattening out‖ over time. That is, in later years, an additional year of age is predicting 
fewer children than it did in the early period. The results from the Cohort variables echo this 
conclusion, as people in the later generations are having fewer children than those from the older 
generations. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
In general, the results presented in this paper confirm many of the findings available in the current 
literature. For example, we found that marriage increases fertility, as does being black and living in 
rural areas. On the other hand, additional years of schooling and higher incomes reduce the fertility of 
respondents in our sample. Importantly, we also found that those who attend religious services more 
regularly have higher fertility than those who do not attend services as often. This effect, although 
slightly attenuated, holds true even when religious denomination is controlled for. 
The results of our cross-sectional analysis also confirm work that suggests Protestants have fewer 
children than Catholics. Traditionally, this gap has been attributed to the relatively stronger position on 




artificial birth control taken by the leadership of the Catholic Church compared to the stance held by 
the leaders of the various Protestant sects. We also found that Catholics have higher fertility than those 
who claim ―other‖ religious affiliations and those who claim to have no religious affiliation. This, too, 
confirms previous research in the area of fertility and religion.  
What is unique about our study is the focus on the fertility of the various Protestant  
sub-denominations. Thanks to work by [9] we were able to separate out the individual Protestant 
traditions and compare their fertility both to each other and to Catholics. Due to the ideology of some 
of the more fundamental Protestant sects, particularly conservative Protestants, which closely mirrors 
the Catholics‘ views on birth control, we expected that the fertility of conservative Protestants would 
be significantly higher than that of mainline Protestants and would even rival the fertility of Catholics. 
That is exactly what we found. When Protestants were separated into four categories (mainline, 
conservative, Black Protestants, and ―other‖ Protestants) we found that only mainline Protestants 
reported significantly fewer children than did Catholics, controlling for a host of religious and 
demographic factors. This suggests that Protestants should not be considered one large homogeneous 
group. While our results underscored this point with regards to fertility, it is likely that the assumption 
that Protestants are a homogeneous group will not hold for a number of other outcome measures. For 
example, it is possible that topics fundamental to the study of religion in society such as religious 
participation and giving would benefit from studying them in light of the individual Protestant sects.  
It is also possible that Catholics are not a homogeneous group. Westoff and Marshall ([38], p. 441) 
found that Hispanics have higher fertility than other ethnic groups and are more likely to be Catholic. 
This suggests that within the Catholic religion there may be a difference in fertility along ethnic lines. 
We leave this topic for future research. Another interesting avenue for future research would be to 
decompose the ―conservative‖ Protestant group into its various components. That is, using the work of 
Blanchard et al. [39] as a guide, one could examine the fertility of evangelicals, fundamentalists, and 
Pentecostals separately. It is possible that these groups would show markedly different rates of 
fertility. As the within-conservative Protestant differences were not the focus of this paper, we also 
leave that for future research. 
In addition to treating Protestants as a heterogeneous group, we also looked at the fertility trends of 
the various religious denominations over time. For the last few decades, researchers have documented 
a steady growth in the number of people claiming to be members of religious groups that we would 
classify as ―conservative‖ Protestant. A number of scholars have attributed this growth to the greater 
fertility of the people in these groups along with (although to a much smaller degree) conversion and 
outreach by pastors and laypeople designed to increase membership numbers in specific churches. This 
argument suggests that the fertility of Protestants should be converging with (growing towards) that of 
Catholics and that the fertility of conservative Protestants in particular should be diverging (growing 
away) from that of Catholics.  
In general, convergence/divergence implies two possible scenarios: First, the fertility of the specific 
groups are moving towards each other or away from each other at equal rates over time; that is, one 
group is having more/less children, while the other is having less/more children. Second, the fertility 
rates of one group are moving toward the other group, while the rates of the other group remain 
constant. Third, if two groups are becoming similar over time, then the rates of one group could exhibit 
a steeper slope than the rates of another group. That is, for example, the rates of Catholics may exhibit 




slope X, while the rates of conservative Protestants may exhibit a steeper slope, 2X. Thus, the fertility 
rates of conservative Protestants are ―catching up‖ to the fertility rates of Catholics. It is these ideas 
that we tested with our trend analyses. 
Although not presented in Table 3, we found no evidence for the converging of the fertility of 
Catholics and the fertility of Protestants. In fact, over time, there was a significant and negative 
interaction between a dummy variable for Protestant and our linear trend term. This means that the 
number of children reported by Protestants is growing smaller over time, relative to Catholics. Hence, 
we found a divergence and not a convergence in our results. As we cautioned above, however, it is 
probably a mistake to treat Protestants as one large homogeneous group. When Protestants are 
separated into their respective components and reentered into the model, the effect of time disappears. 
We found no significant trends in the fertility of mainline, conservative, Black Protestants, or other 
Protestants relative to Catholics. This means that our second proposition, that the fertility of 
conservative Protestants is surpassing that of Catholics and growing away from them, was not 
supported either. It seems as though the fertility rates of the various groups have not changed much 
over time. The exceptions to this were the fertility of those who claimed ―other‖ religions and those 
who claimed ―no religion.‖ Over time, they both had significantly fewer children, on average, 
than Catholics.  
One of the key implications of these findings is that conservative Protestants are a growing political 
force in American politics, not only because of the resonance of their movement‘s message but 
because of their high fertility rates. The prominence of the ―religious right‖ in the contemporary 
conservative movement is one reason for its increased political and cultural power. Future research 
should explore the political implications of conservative Protestant fertility more directly. For 
example, are children born to conservative Protestant parents more likely to embrace conservative 
political identifications, vote for conservative candidates, and participate in elections? Additionally, 
are conservative Protestants‘ political orientations stable over time, or are there significant age, period, 
or cohort effects within this group? Conservative Protestant cohorts represent a particularly fruitful 
avenue for future study. Specifically, one key issue is whether higher fertility rates are translating into 
greater cohort sizes or, conversely, are a large number of children born to conservatives ―leaving the 
flock.‖ Moreover, it would be interesting to examine the political orientations of conservative 
Protestant cohorts and whether or not cohort size engenders greater political unity or diversity. 
Altogether, there is no doubt that conservative Protestants are a major political force in the U.S., 
however, their relatively high fertility may well ensure that they remain powerful for years to come. 
In sum, this paper asked two fairly straightforward questions: 1) Are there differences in the fertility 
of the Protestant sub-denominations (particularly that of conservative Protestants)? And, 2) Does the 
growth in the number of conservative Protestants in the United States mean that the gap between 
Protestant and Catholic fertility is shrinking over time? Our findings suggest that there are indeed 
differences in fertility among the individual Protestant sects, but that those differences are not growing 
(or shrinking) over time. Additionally, the gap between Catholics and Protestants is not getting smaller 
and, especially among mainline Protestants, is getting larger. 
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